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The opinion m Sterling v XVeustem, allowing self-help as the only
remedy for intruding trees, is certainly contrary to the majority rule.
The reasonable solution to the problem is to make the remedy depend
upon the extent of injury If the action is "groundless and vexatious,"
not showing any real injury, the remedy of self-help would appear to
be sufficient. When the injury is increased so as to be classified as a
"sensible injury" one should have an action at law for the actual
damages caused. If, however, the injury is serious and threatens to
involve many successive law suits for the continuing trespass, or
threatens to become serious, one should have, besides an action at law
for the actual damages sustained, an action in equity to enjoin planting
or force removal.
ROBERT C. MOFFIT
THE QUESTIONABLE USE OF RES GESTAE -
DAWS v COMMONWEALTH
One of the most controversial subjects in the field of evidence is
res gestae. This legal concept was introduced into the law to admit
statements surrounding the commission of an act so that the nature of
the act could be clearly understood. If the words surrounding an act
are not admitted, the act alone may be incomplete and ambiguous.
The Kentucky court has applied the term res gestae to at least five
distinct rules of evidence: verbal act, spontaneous exclamation, circum-
stantial evidence, mental and physical condition, and admissions of an
agent.' Since it has been extended to include more than one rule of
evidence, the courts and lawyers have tended to intermingle some of
the elements of these well defined principles and created a great deal
of confusion as to the exact grounds upon which certain utterances
are admitted or excluded.
Res gestae is a Latin phrase which means "things done."' In its
use in the law it has been defined as "Matter incidental to the main
fact and explanatory of it, including acts and words which are so
closely connected therewith as to constitute a part of the transaction,
and without a knowledge of which the rmain fact might not be prop-
'Mann v. Cavanaugh, 110 Ky. 776, 62 S.W 854 (1901) (verbal act);
Norton s Adm r v. Winstead, 218 Ky. 488, 291 S.W 723 (1927) (spontaneous
exclamation); Stems Coal Co. v. Evans Adm r, 88 Ky. L. Rep. 755, 111 S.W 808
(1908) (circumstantial evidence); Lousville & N. R. Co. v. Owens, 164 Ky. 557,
175 S.W 1089 (1915) (mental and physical condition); see Niles v. Steiden
Stores, Inc., 801 Ky. 80, 190 S.W 2d 876 (1945) (admissions of an agent).
'WEBSTER s NEw INTERNATIONAL DicTIoNARY, UNABP IED (2d ed. 1944).
RECENT CASES
erly understood."3 As is frequently the case with a general definition,
it has been extended to include some pre-existing rules of evidence
which were recognized before the phrase came into use. The most
frequent examples are the spontaneous exclamation and the verbal
act. Since the verbal act and the spontaneous exclamation are closely
related, it is the purpose of this note to examine the principles under-
lying each and consider them as applied in Daws v Commonwealth.4
The verbal act is defined by Wigmore as an utterance accom-
panying an independent and ambiguous legal act, and is admitted
merely to explain the legal act. , Without the words a clear under-
standing of the act may not be possible. In order to be admissible, the
utterance must satisfy four limitations: (1) the act must be mde-
pendently material, (2) the act must be equivocal, (3) the words must
give legal significance to the act, (4) the words must accompany the
act."i An example is a policeman placing his hand upon a person s
shoulder. Any person may testify as to what the policeman said while
doing the act, for the act itself is ambiguous. He may be arresting
that person or merely greeting him. Since the object is to give legal
effect to a certain act, the utterance must be made by the actor to be
admissible. It must not only accompany the act, but it must be pre-
cisely contemporaneous. If it is not precisely contemporaneous, it will
merely be an assertion relating to a past act and be inadmissible.
A spontaneous exclamation is defined "as a statement or exclama-
tion made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant
or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is
observed by him."7 Since the statements are made under stress of
nervous excitement, they are admitted to prove the truth of the fact
asserted, because they are made without time for reason and reflection
and therefore tend to preclude fabrication. Before statements will be
admitted under this rule, three factors must exist: 8 (1) some occur-
rence startling enough to produce a nervous excitement which renders
the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must be
made while under the influence of shock and excitement so as to
preclude fabrication; (3) the utterance must relate to the occurrence.
The time element, while not as critical as in the verbal act, is im-
portant in determining the continuance of the shock or excitement.
A good example of a spontaneous exclamation occurred in Demeter v
BALLENTINE S LAW DICTIONARY (1930).
'314 Ky. 265, 234 S.W 2d 953 (1950).
6 Wic topx, Evidence 191 (3d ed 1940).
0 Id. at 192.
'Keefe v. State, 5 Anz. 293, - 72 P 2d 425, 427 (1937).
'Showalter v. Western Pae. R. Co., 16 Col. 2d 460, 106 P. 2d 895, 900
(1940).
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Rosenbzrgll where the decedent was found at the bottom of a flight
of stairs and remained unconscious for an hour and a half. As soon as
she regained consciousness she told her daughter, "I missed my step
and fell down the stairs." The daughter was permitted to testify to
what the decedent said although the statement was made an hour and
a half after the accident. From tins case it is apparent that the declara-
tion need not be precisely contemporaneous with the act, but the per-
son making the statement must remain in a state of shock or excite-
ment from the time the act was committed until the statement is made.
It must also be noted that a statement by a bystander is admissible
under this rule.1
From the above analysis it is apparent that the verbal act and the
spontaneous exclamation are separate and distinct principles. An
utterance made by a bystander is admissible as a spontaneous exclama-
tion but not as a verbal act. The utterance must be precisely con-
temporaneous under the verbal act doctrine. Under the spontaneous
exclamation rule, the true test as to time is not when the exclamation
was made but is whether, under all the circumstances, the speaker
may be considered as speaking under stress of nervous excitement or
whether the excitement has abated. Since the courts include both
these rules under the term res gestae, there has been a tendency to
apply the time limitations of the verbal act to spontaneous exclama-
tions.
The recent case of Daws v Commonwealth" will serve as a good
illustration of the confusion of the various elements of the rules in-
cluded under res gestae. In that case, Daws was convicted of malicious
shooting and the statements made by an arch enemy were mstru-
mental in identifying Daws as the one who shot at Daulton. Daws
allegedly shot at Daulton about 100 to 125 yards from a church. After
the shot Daulton drove slowly to the church and approximately three
minutes after he arrived he said "that Daws shot at him." Two wit-
nesses were permitted to testify as to ,what Daulton said. On appeal
this evidence was held inadmissible as not part of the res gestae and
the judgment was reversed. Whether this testimony was held mad-
missible under the verbal act rule or under the spontaneous exclama-
tion rule cannot be readily determined for the court applied limitations
applicable to both. In one part of the opinion the court said the
declaration "must be substantially contemporaneous with the shooting
and illustrate, elucidate, or explain the manner in which the shooting
114 N.J.S. 43, 175 AtI. 621 (1934).
'
0 Bennett v. Seattle, 22 Wash. 2d 445, 156 P. 2d 685 (1945).
314 Ky. 265, 234 S.W 2d 953 (1950).
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was done." In another part of the opinion the court said the act
"'must be the apparently spontaneous result of the occurrence oper-
ating upon the perceptive senses of the speaker. "12 In these two
sentences the court is expounding two distinct principles; the first ap-
plies to the verbal act and the second refers to a spontaneous exclama-
tion. In applying these two principles the court found that the state-
ment was not spontaneous nor substantially contemporaneous.
After finding that the statement was not spontaneous nor sub-
stantially contemporaneous, the court distinguished the present case
from Norton s Adm r v Winsfead.l3 In that case, Winstead shot and
fatally wounded Norton. "Witnesses heard Norton cry out and they
reached him within three minutes after the shooting. The lower court
refused to let the witnesses testify as to what Norton said, but on ap-
peal the evidence was held admissible. The court stated:
"The admission of statements as a part of the res gestae is not con-
trolled wholly by the question of time, but probably the controlling
question is whether or not there was an opportunity to deliberately
make up a statement between the happemng of the event and the
time of making the statement. Before a statement can be admitted as
a part of the res gestae, the nervous excitement produced by the
happemng must still predominate, and the reflective processes of the
mind must be in abeyance.""
From this statement it is apparent that the evidence was admitted
as a spontaneous exclamation. However, the court distinguished the
Daws case from the Norton case on the grounds that in the Daws case
the statements were not made at the scene of the shooting while
they were in the Norton case. An inference can be drawn from this
distinction that if Daulton had remained at the scene of the shooting
is statement would have been admissible.
Even if we assume that Daulton made the statement at the scene
of the shooting and three minutes afterwards, it is doubtful if it should
have been admissible. In the Norton case, Norton was mortally
wounded and believed death to be imminent. There were sufficient
facts in that case to conclude that Norton was in a state of shock and
nervous excitement. In the Daws case, the court does not mention that
Daulton may have been in a state of excitement. It is a logical infer-
ence that if some men were shot at and narrowly escaped death,
they would be in a state of excitement far in excess of three minutes.
It is surprising that this point was not made since it seems to afford
the only basis for the admission of the evidence. Evidently the attor-
Id. at 267, 234 S.W 2d at 954.
218 Ky. 488, 291 S.W 723 (1947).
"Id. at 489, 291 S.W at 723.
KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
neys did not offer any evidence to show that Daulton may have been
in a state of excitement, but proceeded to put forth some elements
of the various rules which are included within the phrase res gestae.
Although the courts use the term res gestae, the problem still re-
mains to find the particular exception to the hearsay rule under which
the evidence is admitted or excluded. No matter what labels the
courts apply it still must be determined what the courts actually do.
Since that can only be determined by resorting to independent rules
of evidence, what purpose does the phrase res gestae serve? This
writer has failed to find any worthwhile purpose and can only conclude
that it has created a great deal of confusion. The definition of the
term is broad and ambiguous. It has not been applied to any rules of
evidence which have not been previously named and defined. Since
it has not been extended to any new principle of evidence, it is not of
any value. If resort still must be had to the independent rules of
evidence, the phrase res gesta" should be discarded for more exact
definitions and terms.
ER-EsT W Rrvs
REMAINDER TO GRANTOR'S HEIRS IN KENTUCKY
In the recent case of Powell v Childers,' the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky seems to have permitted the creation of a remainder m the
heirs of the grantor contrary to the so-called Doctrine of Worthier
Title. It is the purpose of this note to determine the present status
of this common law rule in Kentucky and to point out how it might
have been applied in the Powell case.
The case in issue arose when D. D. Wilder and his wife conveyed
real property to one Childers by deed of general warranty Upon an
examination of title, a deed by Wilder to his wife was discovered
which contained the following granting clause:
"" unto the party of the second part, for and during her natural
life, with remainder to the heirs of the first party."
The habendum clause contained this language:
"It is understood that second party already owns an undivided one-
half interest in and to said real estate and first party desires now, and
has by this writing conveyed to second party, his wife, his undivided
one-half interest therein, same to be and belong to second party dur-
ing her natural life, and upon her death said property, or at least the
one-half undivided interest of first party therein, and now conveyed,
shall go to the heirs of first party."
'Powell v. Childers, 314 Ky. 45, 234 S.W 2d 158 (1950).
